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Abstract—Conventional Hardware Trojan (HT) detection techniques
are based on the validation of integrated circuits to determine changes
in their functionality, and on non-invasive side-channel analysis to identify
the variations in their physical parameters. In particular, almost all the
proposed side-channel power-based detection techniques presume that
HTs are detectable because they only add gates to the original circuit
with a noticeable increase in power consumption. This paper demonstrates
how undetectable HTs can be realized with zero impact on the power
and area footprint of the original circuit. Towards this, we propose a
novel concept of TrojanZero and a systematic methodology for designing
undetectable HTs in the circuits, which conceals their existence by gate-
level modifications. The crux is to salvage the cost of the HT from the
original circuit without being detected using standard testing techniques.
Our methodology leverages the knowledge of transition probabilities of
the circuit nodes to identify and safely remove expendable gates, and
embeds malicious circuitry at the appropriate locations with zero power
and area overheads when compared to the original circuit. We synthesize
these designs and then embed in multiple ISCAS85 benchmarks using a
65nm technology library, and perform a comprehensive power and area
characterization. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed
TrojanZero designs are undetectable by the state-of-the-art power-based
detection methods.
Index Terms—Hardware Trojans, Power Analysis, Area, Signal Prob-
ability, ATPG
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
The emerging complexity of modern embedded devices and asso-
ciated cost of advanced CMOS fabrication have increased the trend
of outsourcing integrated circuits (ICs) manufacturing processes to
untrusted third-parties [1]. The IC supply chain comprises of various
development stages that typically involve untrusted entities such as
third-party IP vendors, EDA tools and fabrication foundries as shown
in Fig. 1. Consequently, they are vulnerable to a wide range of HT
attacks at some stage of the manufacturing process, which may lead
to leakage of sensitive information to an adversary, modification in
functionality, and degraded performance of integrated circuits [2].
A. HT Detection Techniques
To mitigate the potential threats of HT attacks in the supply chain,
various HT detection techniques have been proposed. Typically, HT
detection is performed at the design time (pre-silicon), or after manu-
facturing (post-silicon) depending on the un-trusted entity involved in
the entire process as depicted in Fig. 1. These techniques are broadly
classified into logic-based testing [3], and side-channel analysis [4].
a) Logic-based Detection: Logic-based detection includes
equivalence checking [5], and exhaustive simulation [6] which pro-
vide 100% coverage. However, such techniques are not scalable, and
applicable only to smaller circuits. Moreover, equivalence checking
can only be deployed at the pre-silicon stage. Techniques based on
automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) can be used at the post-
silicon stage to generate a small set of test vectors that can excite
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Fig. 1: IC supply chain stages susceptible to malicious insertions
include: (a) Third party IP core (b) EDA tools (c) Untrusted foundries.
Pre-silicon detection techniques are employed at the design stage, and
post-silicon methods are used at testing and deployment phase.
HT trigger nodes [7]. Such techniques maximizes the probability of
triggering HTs [8], however, the detection probability and coverage
cannot be guaranteed to be 100%.
b) Side-channel Analysis: The detection techniques based on
analysis of side-channel measurements are premised on the assump-
tion that HTs distort the parametric profile of the IC. This includes
measuring the variations in the observable physical parameters, such
as power, delay and temperature to detect any alteration in the IC [9].
Of these, the most commonly used techniques for HT detection are
based on power analysis at the post-silicon stage. Some notable works
include statistically analyzing the power traces through multiple ports
[10] to identify HTs. Gate-level characterization using a set of power
measurements is proposed in [11] to determine the increase in leakage
power due to the addition of malicious gates. Similarly, a sparse gate
profiling technique is proposed to detect increase in the leakage power
of circuits using statistical learning [12].
In short, the above-discussed techniques primarily rely on the
assumption that HTs are additive, i.e., the malicious circuitry is
embedded by adding gates to the HT-free circuit, resulting in an
increase in circuit area and power consumption. The goal of this
paper is to challenge these underlying assumptions, i.e., are HTs
necessarily additive in terms of power and area?
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Fig. 2: Proposed flow for our TrojanZero Methodology: (a) HT-free circuit is functionally verified using defender’s Test Patterns (TPs), and
analyzed for computing power and area thresholds. (b) Signal probabilities of the nodes are computed and expendable gates are identified.
(c) An HT (i.e., a TrojanZero instance) is embedded in the modified circuit with zero power and area overheads.
B. Motivational Analysis and Research Challenges
Our analysis in Fig. 3 shows the percentage overhead in terms
of power and area that is assumed by some of the state-of-the-art
methodologies [10]–[12] for successful detection of a single HT in
ISCAS benchmark c499. Following key observations are made from
this experimental analysis:
1) Dynamic and leakage power of the HT-infected circuit are per-
ceptibly increased when compared to that of HT-free circuit for
successful detection. For instance, the dynamic power of the HT-
infected circuit is assumed to exceed at least by 0.265% as depicted
by observation point X. Similarly, the percentage increase assumed
for leakage power-based HT detection is shown by Y1 and Y2.
2) The area of the circuit is assumed to increase due to presence of
an HT. For instance, points A1, A2 and A3 show an increase in the
area by 0.7%, 1.95% and 0.58% compared to that of HT-free circuit.
The above-discussed defence techniques appear to work if the in-
crements in power and area are discernible, hence we are going to
refrain these additive effects such that HTs are undetected by the
existing state-of-the-art methodologies. The open question that is not
addressed in the literature is: how to modify a given circuit in order
to insert an HT such that its total power consumption and area are
equal to that of a HT-free circuit. We refer to this as devising a
TrojanZero methodology with zero power and area overheads.
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Fig. 3: Minimum power and area overheads that are assumed by state-
of-the-art techniques [10]–[12] for successful detection of a single HT
in ISCAS benchmark c499.
C. Attack Model
In the proposed attack model, we assume that the attacker resides at
the foundry where she can modify the circuit in the form of addition,
deletion or modification of the gates during fabrication [1]. Moreover,
the attacker acquires the knowledge of specific testing techniques that
are used by the defender for the functional validation of circuit after
fabrication. The attacker seeks to modify the circuit such that:
1) It deviates from the original functionality for certain inputs.
2) Functionality is not altered on the defender’s testing inputs.
3) Power and area are not increased and HTs are undetectable by
the power-based post fabrication analysis.
Prior works have identified two types of HTs: (i) untargeted HTs
only seek to arbitrarily modify the circuit behavior for certain inputs;
and (ii) targeted HTs modify the circuit behavior for attacker chosen
inputs in an attacker-specified manner. While the primary goal of
the TrojanZero is to introduce targeted HTs, we will notice that it
necessitates the introduction of additional untargeted HTs as well.
D. Our Novel Contributions
In this work, we propose a novel concept of TrojanZero along with
an HT insertion methodology that may subvert the normal operation
of ICs, and has no additional overheads in terms of power and area.
Our primary contributions in a nutshell are:
1) Devising a scheme to identify rarely-activated nodes in the circuit
with extremely low signal probabilities.
2) An algorithm to explore the space of circuit modifications that
leave the circuit’s functionality on the defender’s test patterns un-
changed.
3) A methodology to embed HTs in the target circuit such that there
is no increase in total power along with its components, and area.
4) Implementation of an HT with a low triggering probability (<
10−4) during the functional testing phase.
II. METHODOLOGY TO DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT TROJANZERO
The high-level flow of our proposed TrojanZero methodology is
shown in Fig. 2. It comprises of three main steps as depicted, and
explained in the subsequent sections.
A. Computation of Power and Area Thresholds
In the first phase, thresholds of the HT-free circuit are computed
in terms of power, its components, and area footprint.
1) Generating Test Patterns and Functional Verification: A set
of defender-specific test patterns is generated for the HT-free circuit
through logic-based testing techniques. Functional verification of
the circuit is performed by monitoring the outputs against the test
patterns (TPs) through simulations. The circuit is re-verified in case
of functional failure.
2) Power and Area Analysis: The verified HT-free circuit is
synthesized using the technology library while optimizing it for
minimum power. This follows computation of the total power and
its constituents, i.e., dynamic and leakage power. Moreover, the area
of the circuit is computed in terms of number of gate equivalents
(GE) with respect to the technology after synthesis using the ASIC
design tools. This analysis of the HT-free circuit is used to specify
the power and area thresholds that are to be strictly adhered while
embedding HTs.
B. Salvaging Circuit Power and Area
We propose Algorithm 1 to salvage power and area from the HT-
free circuit with n nodes. It executes as follows:
1) Inputs: HT-free circuit (N ), a set of q defender’s functional
testing algorithms with generated TPs, along with the reference power
(P(N )), and area (A(N )) computed during analysis.
2) Computation of Switching Probabilities: The circuit is trans-
lated into its corresponding model using a netlist translator, which
computes the signal probabilities at each node for being at logic
0 or 1 as depicted in Lines 2, and 3. For this, we develop a
library comprising of basic and complex gates. Each gate computes
the probabilities (Pg=0, Pg=1) at its output node based on the
probabilities of signals at its inputs. Similar to other approaches in
this field, we also assume that the signal probability at each primary
input is 0.5.
3) Identification of Expendable Gates: Based on the attacker-
specified probability threshold (Pth), a list of candidate gates (C)
is obtained that comprises of circuit nodes with signal probabilities
close to zero or one as shown in Line 10. Each candidate gate
is checked for its possible removal from the circuit after detailed
functional testing. For this, each node from C with a signal proba-
bility close to one is removed and connected to logic 1. Similarly,
the output node of gate with signal probability close to zero is
connected to logic 0 as depicted in Line 13. After removing a single
element from C, each of the previous gate is eliminated safely if
its output is not connected to any other node of the circuit. This
follows detailed functional testing using the defender’s q validation
algorithms with all TPs. If functional tests are successful then the
gates under consideration are successfully removed. However, if any
of the test fails, the changes made in the circuit are reverted and next
gate from C is tested as depicted in Line 20. This procedure would
ensure that such a change in the circuit would go undetected by the
defender’s post-silicon test techniques.
4) Power and Area Differential Gains: After candidates from C
are tested and the identified gates are removed, we compute power
and area of the modified circuit (N ′) as shown in Line 26. Moreover,
the differential with respect to the HT-free circuit (N ) is computed to
determine the salvaged cost in terms of total power, its components
and area.
C. HT Insertion using TrojanZero Methodology
We propose Algorithm 2 to insert an HT with zero power and
area (TZ), employing our TrojanZero methodology. The algorithm
Algorithm 1 : Salvaging Power and Area
Input:
N = {N1, N2, ..., Nn}: Verified HT-free circuit with n nodes
Algo = {T1, T2, ..., Tq}: q testing algorithms of defender
Pth = Attacker specified threshold probability
P(N ) = Power of N , A(N ) = Area of N
Output:
N ′ = {N ′1, N ′2, ..., N ′t}: Modified circuit with t nodes
P(N ′) = Power of N ′, A(N ′) = Area of N ′
Goal:
∆P = P(N ) - P(N ′), and ∆A = A(N ) - A(N ′)
Initialize: i=1, j=1, k=1, m=1; s=1,
1: while i ≤ n do
2: P (Ni=0) = Pg=0, Pg=0 ∈ {P(NAND=0), ..., P(OR=0)};
3: P (Ni=1) = Pg=1, Pg=1 ∈ {P(NAND=1), ..., P(OR=1)};
4: if P (Ni=0) ≥ Pth then X = {C1, C2, ..., Cj}; X ⊂ N
5: j=j+1;
6: end if
7: if P (Ni=1) ≥ Pth then Y = {C1, C2, ..., Ck}; Y ⊂ N
8: k=k+1;
9: end if
10: C = X ∪ Y; i = i + 1; . Candidate nodes (C)
11: end while
12: while m≤ j+k do . Testing each C(m) for removal
13: if C(m) ∈ X then C(m)=0; . Replace node with 0
14: Remove preceding gates and update circuit to N ′;
15: else if C(m) ∈ Y then C(m)=1; . Replace node with 1
16: Remove preceding gates and update circuit to N ′;
17: while s ≤ q do . Testing Algorithm 1 to q
18: if T(s) == Pass then s=s+1; . ∀ TPs
19: else
20: Revert changes in circuit N ′; s=q;
21: end if
22: end while
23: end if
24: m=m+1;
25: end while
26: Compute P(N ′), A(N ′), ∆P, and ∆A;
provides a procedure for an attacker to systematically exploit the
salvaged cost of the modified circuit. This not only makes TZ
extremely hard for the defender to be triggered even with bespoke
functional test patterns, but renders its existence undetectable from
the power and area based analysis techniques.
1) HT Placement: To subvert the desired operation of the circuit,
HT from the library of n existing malicious circuits is selected and
carefully inserted within N ′. The payload of the HT can be triggered
by the attacker-chosen set of vectors provided either by internal or
external means. After placement of an HT with an imperceptible
trigger for which m locations are available for insertion, functional
testing is performed with q algorithms of the defender. If the test
fails, the HT is placed at the next target location as shown in line 6.
2) Power and Area Analysis: After successful functional testing
on defender algorithms, power (P(N ′′)) and area (A(N ′′)) of the
TZ-infected circuit (N ′′) are analyzed to ascertain that it does not
surpass the defined thresholds. Conversely, if this is not true, then
the entire process of HT insertion is repeated by selecting another
HT from the library. This follows insertion of the dummy logic
gates (if required) to meet the baseline conditions for successful
insertion of TZ. These conditions assert that power consumption
and area are equivalent to the prescribed thresholds, i.e., ∆P(TZ)
= 0, and ∆A(TZ) = 0, as depicted in Line 13. It is mandatory to
analyze individual components of power, i.e., dynamic and leakage,
independently. These components vary depending upon the location
Algorithm 2 : HT insertion using TrojanZero methodology
Input:
N ′ = {N ′1, N ′2, ..., N ′t}: Modified circuit with t nodes
Algo = {T1, T2, ..., Tq}: Set of q functional testing algorithms
HT ∈ {{HT1, HT2, ..., HTn}: Library with n HTs
l ∈ {{l1, l2, ..., lm}: m potential location in N’
P(N ) = Power of HT-free circuit N
A(N ) = Area of HT-free circuit N
P(N ′) = Power of modified circuit N ′
A(N ′) = Area of modified circuit N ′
Output:
N ′′ = TZ-infected circuit
P(N ′′) = Power of N ′′, A(N ′′) = Area of N ′′
Goal:
∆P(TZ) = P(N ) - (P(HT) + P(N ′)) = 0
∆A(TZ) = A(N ) - (A(HT) + A(N ′)) = 0
Initialize: i=1, j=1, s=1;
1: while i ≤ n do
2: while j ≤ m do
3: while s ≤ q do
4: Place HT(i) at location l(j);
5: if T(s) == Pass then s=s+1; . Test with next Algo
6: else j=j+1; . Place HT at next location goto 2
7: end if
8: end while
9: j = m; goto 11;
10: end while
11: Compute P(N ′′) = P(HT) + P(N ′);
12: Compute A(N ′′) = A(HT) + A(N ′);
13: if ∆P(TZ) = 0 && ∆A(TZ) = 0 then
14: HT with zero power and area successfully inserted; i = n;
15: else
16: i=i+1;
17: end if
18: end while
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Fig. 4: Asynchronous Counter-based HT [14]
and configuration of HT gates within circuit. It is plausible that one
of the components surpasses the defined threshold, while total power
consumption remains within the specified constraints.
The insertion of TZ in the modified circuit using Algorithm 2 is
undetectable to the post-fabrication tests performed by the defender.
Therefore, it introduces, (i) targeted explicit behavior to modify
functionality on attacker specified vectors [13]; (ii) targeted implicit
behavior while evading side-channel analysis, i.e., power and area.
III. CASE STUDY: INTRUDING 8-BIT ALU USING TROJANZERO
To demonstrate the practicability of the proposed approach, we
apply the concepts of TrojanZero on ISCAS benchmark c880 (8-bit
ALU) [15].
A. Computation of Power and Area
We assume that the defender performs functional testing using
ATPG stuck-at model. This model is prominently used for diagnostic
test generation of transition faults after fabrication, where the nets
of circuits are assumed to be stuck at a fixed logic value [16].
TPs generated from the test algorithm are used to ascertain the
functionality of c880. The total power consumption and area footprint
in terms of gate equivalents (GE) is determined as 77.2 µW, and 365.4
GE, respectively. Similarly, the cell level dynamic and leakage power
components are 70.35 µW, and 6.87 µW, respectively.
B. Maximizing the Differential of Power and Area
We apply Algorithm 1 to salvage the cost in terms of power and
area by identifying expendable gates. For each gate of c880, we
compute signal probabilities at its output node. We compute the set of
candidate gates (C) by specifying Pth= 0.992. Choosing high value
of Pth provides less number of candidates, however, it increases the
ratio of the gates that can be removed from the identified candidates.
Moreover, the probability of detecting modifications on defender’s
bespoke vectors decreases with the higher value of selected Pth. The
set C comprises 27 gate whose signal probabilities are above Pth
or below 1 − Pth. Fig. 5 shows two segments of c880 comprising
of nodes in set C . The set C includes the four AND gates in
segment A, i.e., N476, N478, N480 and N482, and the four OR
gates highlighted in segment B. Now, we first remove AND (N476)
and connect the corresponding input of NOR (N503) to logic 0. This
is followed by checking whether any additional independent gates
can be removed. However, there is no independent removable gate as
AND (N432) is interconnected with adjacent AND gates, and NOT
(N310) is connected with other nodes. Next, functional testing is
performed and Algorithm 1 determines that this node can indeed be
removed from set C. Similarly, all other candidate gates are removed
iteratively. If, at any step, functional testing fails, the modified circuit
is reverted to the previous step. After iterating over all gates in C,
we test that AND (432) can be expended safely, since all the gates
driven by this node have already been removed. All such preceding
gates are checked for their secure removal. Similarly, the expendable
gates in segment B of c880 are highlighted in Fig. 5. It is observed
from the application of Algorithm 1 on segments A and B that the
gate driving node N287 can also be expended. After detailed analysis,
we successfully salvaged the cost of 11 logic gates from c880. We
compute the power and area of the modified circuit to be 70.2 µW,
and 329.7 GE. This gives us a differential of 7 µW in power, and
35.7 GE in area footprint that we can used to embed HT.
C. TrojanZero Implementation
We execute Algorithm 2 on the modified circuit to insert an
asynchronous counter-based HT [14] as shown in Fig. 4. This HT
modifies the signal S, whenever the select input q of the multiplexer
is set to logic 1 by the counter. We placed this HT to modify carry-
in (N261) of the c880 ALU on a trigger signal from the counter.
The inputs to generate the trigger are provided from rarely-activated
nodes of the circuit such that it is not activated during the defender’s
functional testing. With the insertion of 3-bit counter for trigger
generation, it is observed that the total power consumed by the TZ-
infected circuit is 76.4 µW. Moreover, dynamic and leakage power
components are 69.32 µW. and 6.85 µW, respectively. Similarly,
the cell area of the TZ-infected c880 has a footprint of 362.8
GE. Therefore, the outputs of Algorithm 2 in terms of TrojanZero
parameters are: ∆PT (TZ) = 0.8 µW, ∆A(TZ) = 2.6 GE, ∆PD(TZ)
= 1.03 µW, ∆PL(TZ)= 0.02µW, where T, D, and L represents total,
dynamic and leakage power. The outputs show that TZ-infected
circuit has almost equal power and area compared to the HT-free
circuit. Therefore, this counter-based HT will not be detected with
the state-of-the-art power analysis based HT detection.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
We evaluate the proposed methodology on a set of ISCAS85
benchmarks. The experimental setup used for the design and im-
plementation of TrojanZero is depicted in Fig. 6. All the simulations
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are executed on the Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 6.8 based
computing machine with 8-Core processor @ 2.4 GHz, and 16 GB
memory, and using the following tools:
1) Synopsys TetraMAX (2016) for automated test generation for the
circuits. The circuit is given as input to the tool, which generate the
test patterns using the stuck-at model.
2) Matlab 9.1 (R2016b) based program to compute node probabili-
ties of the HT-free circuit.
3) Mentor Graphics ModelSim 10.5a for circuit verification during
each phase of TrojanZero implementation.
4) Synopsys Design Compiler (2016) for synthesizing each circuit
using 65nm TSMC technology to perform the detailed analysis based
on power and area.
Table I depicts the Pth, number of elements in the set C, expendable
gates (Eg), and the estimated probability (Pft) for activating HT
using random functional testing. The summary of power and area
analysis of the HT-free (N ), modified (N ′), and TZ-infected (N ′′)
circuits is given for comparison. Based on our experimental results,
following observations are made:
1) Dynamic, and Leakage Power Analysis: The power consump-
tion of the circuit along with its components vary subject to the
size and location of the inserted HT. This is due to the variability
in transition probabilities, and distinct configuration of the different
parts of circuit. Fig. 7 presents the comparison of N , N ′ and N ′′
in terms of leakage and dynamic power consumption. It is observed
that the leakage power is more liable to violate the boundary of
defined constraints compared to the other parameters as depicted by
X. Therefore, size of the inserted HT is mainly dictated by its leakage
power. With the modifications in the circuit and subsequent insertion
of an HT, there is a likelihood that the dynamic power decreases, the
leakage power increases, while the total power remains within the
defined threshold. This observation stems from the fact that the HT
gates leak static power, even when the HT is not triggered. However,
the dynamic power consumption of the N ′′ is typically below the
defined constraint as depicted by Y in Fig. 7. Therefore, leakage of
the circuit is required to be precisely monitored in all phases.
2) Circuit Configuration and Salvaging Cost: The admissible size
of the HT is proportional to the configuration, complexity, and the
salvaged cost of the circuit. There is a potential of inserting multiple
HTs of variable sizes in large complex circuit. Typically, complex
circuits are likely to have more expendable gates. This is due to
the presence of comparatively large number of such nodes that have
extremely low probability of transitioning. It is shown in the Table
I that the benchmark c1908 comprises of almost half the number of
gates compared to that for the c3540, but have 45 expendable gates
compared to 57. The configuration of circuit allows for the selection
of higher Pth and correspondingly more cost is salvaged.
3) Area of TZ-infected Circuit: The observation Z in Fig. 7 shows
that there may be a case, where an area cap is required to be adhered
more strictly compared to other parameters. Table I shows that at the
cost of 45 expendable gates, insertion of 5-bit counter HT in c1908
will have a the margin of 0.2% from the area cap. However, the same
HT has relatively higher margins for dynamic (4.75%), and leakage
(0.8%) power. Therefore, increasing the size of HT will first violate
the area constraint instead of leakage power.
4) Rare-states Combination for HT Trigger: Choosing the nets
with low transition probabilities gives a substantial resistance for
triggering an HT on defender’s random test vectors as depicted by
Pft. However, an HT can be triggered on attacker-chosen vectors.
The baseline condition for the successful implementation of the
TABLE I: TrojanZero Analysis for ISCAS85 Benchmarks (I/P = Inputs, Pth = Threshold Probability, C = Candidate Gates, Eg = Expendable
Gates, N = HT-free circuit, N ′ = Modified circuit, N ′′ = TZ-infected circuit)
Circuit Gates I/P Pth C Eg
HT
(Counter)
Total Power (µW) Area
PftN N ′ N ′′ N N ′ N ′′
c432 160 32 0.975 8 5 2-Bit 35.6 20.83 27.7 186.8 136 163 0.9 · 10−4
c499 202 41 0.993 12 7 3-Bit 181.9 173.4 177.4 463.4 396.4 451.5 6.1 · 10−6
c880 383 60 0.992 27 11 3-Bit 77.2 70.2 76.4 365.4 329.7 362.8 8.0 · 10−6
c1908 880 33 0.9986 43 45 5-Bit 160.9 151.6 157.4 454.7 446.4 453.6 6.1 · 10−8
c3540 1669 50 0.992 41 57 5-Bit 248.5 187.2 241.7 986.8 944.3 980 2.0 · 10−6
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Fig. 7: Comparison of HT-free (N ), modified (N ′) and TZ-infected (N ′′) benchmark circuits in terms of area, leakage and dynamic power.
proposed attack is to ensure that power, its components and area
≈ 0. In some cases, HT-insertion in the modified circuit may
result into negative differential, i.e., discernible decrease of power
and area compared to the HT-free circuit. In such cases, dummy
gates maybe inserted in parallel to the primary inputs with their
outputs unconnected, and thus acquiring negligible differential for
all parameters.
The TrojanZero methodology relies on the condition that attacker
acquires a substantial knowledge pertaining to functional testing
techniques of the defender. This scenario is conceivable, since the
increasing complexity of system-on-a-chip (SoC) integration has
raised the tendency of outsourcing IC testing services to the third-
party vendors. This provides an attacker with a realistic opportu-
nity to obtain relevant information from the third-party. Moreover,
the design-for-testability (DfT) techniques e.g., scan-based testing
structures provide a reasonable insight to the attacker residing at the
foundry about the testing structures employed by the end-user [17].
Apart from the conventional functional testing techniques, the
defender may use a set of random (bespoke) vectors for validation
which are not known to the attacker. The probability of triggering the
targeted HTs using these vectors is very extremely low, as shown by
Pft in Table I. Moreover, the probability to reveal un-targeted HTs
by the random vectors is determined as follows:
Pu =
Nu
2 n
(1)
where, Pu is the probability to trigger an un-targeted HT, Nu
represents the number of random input combinations that triggers
the untargeted HT, and n is the total number of circuit inputs.
The experimental results and discussion advocate our claims that
devising an HT using TrojanZero is a pragmatic approach, which can
reasonably circumvent the existing state-of-the-art power-based HT
detection techniques, and thereby requiring the investigation for new
detection methodologies.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a novel concept of TrojanZero to design and embed
undetectable HTs in the target circuit with absolutely no additional
costs in terms of power and area. Our method leverages the knowl-
edge of circuit configuration to secure meaningful cost in terms of
power and area by decimating its redundant components. We used
the salvaged resources to embed HTs in the circuit while adhering
with the power, and area cap provided by the analysis of a given HT-
free circuit. Our experimental results show that TrojanZero can suc-
cessfully evade the available state-of-the-art HT detection techniques
which have the baseline premise that HT insertion eventuates into
notable increase of power and size of the circuit. Our methodology
provides a foundation for devising new stealthier attacks. An attacker
with a reasonable knowledge of circuit configuration can circumvent
its security with potentially no risk of getting detected. This instigates
a need of exploring more sophisticated and viable techniques for the
post-silicon detection of HTs.
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